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monistic-pantheistic type, as the fundamental and future form of philosophy as metaphysics. After outlining the arguments for such a view, he admits the limited character of our knowledge of the All-One, and leaves to religious faith the function of establishing a moral theology based on faith in the *Good as goal and ground of reality*. Religion remains the strongest power in life, and to philosophy falls the task of clearing a place for religion by showing the limitations and implications of positive science.

While the various essays in this volume have very unequal value for the trained student, all are interesting as expressions of the views of distinguished German thinkers, and they should bring home to the serious-minded layman a sense of the vital function of philosophy in the life of culture to-day.

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Ethics. By JOHN DEWEY and J. H. TUFTS. New York, H. Holt & Company, 1908.—pp. xiii, 618.

The many friends of the authors of this book will be glad to know that it has at length appeared, and that the teaching literature of Ethics has been strengthened by such a thorough-going introduction to the subject. It is of course altogether above the class of the mere compendium and that of the superficial or eclectic manual, being a genuine and successful attempt to present the realities of moral science and conduct in and for themselves, as things as deserving of study and investigation as the facts of any supposed science. It cannot fail to awaken that "vital conviction" at which it aims "of the genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them."

The work consists of three parts, 1) a confessedly sociological and descriptive part dealing with the beginnings and the growth of morality, 2) a theoretical part in which an admirable unification is effected of the teleological and the formal views of morality, and 3) a practical part in which the student is introduced to the "examination" of "unsettled political and economic" problems—it being to the authors "intolerably academic that those interested in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out . . . rather than with questions now urgent."

Part I consists in the main of a fresh and instructive presentation of the facts and stages of instinctive and customary morality and of reflective (or social and rational) morality, along with illustrations (also very much in the usual manner) of the growth of morality

in the case of the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Moderns. The morality of Early Group Life is also described in a convenient and summary manner for the beginner, or for the general student ; and in general the main strength and resources of this part consist in the exhibition of the extent to which nearly all of our "conceptions for the moral" are taken from the group relations, or from the jural and religious aspects, as these have been gradually brought to clearer consciousness." The "kind" man acts as one of the kin ; the caitiff is a captive, the "villain," a feudal tenant, honor and honesty were what the group admired and so on. At the same time the defects as well as the values of customary morality are sharply dealt with, and the connection of all this formative, and transitional, and incipiently rational and social morality, with what in Book II is called the moral situation proper, is skillfully suggested and partly elaborated. The moral life is on the one hand a life of purpose and on the other a "transforming life," and there is always implicit in it the distinction between the "what" and the "how" — the choice between lower (personal) and "higher" aspects, and the recognition of "*some standard or some sense of duty and law*" [italics mine]. We shall inquire below whether the theoretical part adequately provides for such a standard or law.

In Part II we have first a careful preliminary attempt to get at the essence of the "moral situation." This arises, we are shown, when the ends of our actions seem to compete with another : conduct as "moral" may be defined as "activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon." Then follows a *quasi* "phenomenological" treatment of the problem of the moral judgment. The questions a "thoughtful and progressive" individual must consider in his own conduct about the "meaning of his habits" and the "problem of moral advance" are (1) What is the Good? (2) How is this Good known? (3) When it is known, how does it acquire authority? What is the place of law and duty in the moral life? (4) What is the place of selfhood in the moral process? *etc.* Historically, we are shown, the problem of the nature of the Good became the problem of the Control of Affections and Desires, and this again became the Problem of the Control of Private Interests by Law, and this last the Problem of Individuality and Citizenship. All this, however, is, as it were, modestly recognized to be a mere "hap-hazard" method of treatment, and Professor Dewey goes on in true Pragmatist

fashion to select the principle which "seems most useful in conducting inquiry," warning us at the same time against the danger of "undue simplification." The three fundamental types of Moral Theory selected are those of the division into (1) Teleological and Jural, (2) Individual and Institutional, (3) Empirical and Intuitionist. The first of these is (by a play of subtility) immediately treated of as the division of Voluntary Activity into Inner and Outer, into the "What" and the "How" of moral action of Part I, and after much skilful argumentation in which the *pros* and the *cons* of the "consequence" and the "attitude" ways of judging of morality are set forth, along with the extent to which these two points of view cross and must cross in actual life, we learn that the "*great need of the moral agent* is thus a *character* which will make him as open as possible to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior," and that, consequently, the "appropriate" *subject-matter of the moral judgment* [obviously another "most useful" principle for conducting inquiry] is the "disposition of the person as manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences rather than others to be considered and esteemed."

The second main inquiry of this Part II — But what is the Good by which we thus determine consequences [an inquiry that is evidently, with Professor Dewey's characteristic subtility, put forward as an equivalent of the second of the above-mentioned three types of ethical theory], — is now taken up. The entire inquiry is indeed a fine piece of sustained, concrete, philosophical reflection, throwing much fresh interest into the old hackneyed controversies of my 'good' and my 'pleasure' and my 'desires' [the 'Individual,' I take it] and the good of all ('Institutional'?) and the 'objective conditions' of happiness and endeavor. And it reposes in an illuminating way upon the idea or the result already reached of a correspondence or a harmony between good in intention and good in result, — a correspondence, by the way, that of itself tends to bridge the old hiatus between individual desire and common good. "There is no difference (such as early Utilitarianism made) between good as standard and good as aim, because only a voluntary preference for and interest in a social good is capable, otherwise than by coincidence or accident, of producing acts which have common good as their result." And as for the result in general of this examination of the Good as Happiness, the harmony reached by the book between happiness or pleasure as subjectively desired by the individual and happiness as an objective thing or good, is worded as follows: "Happiness consists in the agreement whether

anticipated or realized of the objective conditions brought about by our endeavors with our desires and our purposes." And this conception of happiness [at bottom the Aristotelian, the dynamic, instead of the passivistic or the atomistic] is admirably contrasted in the appropriate sections of the book with the old notion, "that it is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or feeling." As it is put on p. 301, the "true or final happiness of an individual . . . lies not in objective achievement of results, but in the supremacy within character of an alert, sincere, and persistent interest in those habits and institutions which forward common ends among men."

An equally ingenious introduction is now made of the third type of ethical theory, the distinction between the Empirical and the Intuitional. The very problem of moral knowledge raises, as it were, the question: Is there a distinct and separate faculty of moral reason? Here Kant is first taken up with the result (the usual result) that his formalism is wrong, but that his contention for the "true rationalization" of desire is justifiable. And then as for the conflict of duty (or a special faculty, or intuition) with desire, we are finally told that this "conflict" is an "accompaniment of a growing self," that disposition as manifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth, "and that this worth [Professor Dewey's old point of a unification of the teleological and the formal] consists in a readiness to regard the general happiness against contrary promptings of personal comfort and gain." Having now been made to rest upon the needs of a *growing self* as the apparent explanation of all morality and all moral theory, we are now treated in this part to a disputation new and old upon the place of the Self in morality, — Self-Denial, Self-Assertion, Self-Regard and Other Regard, Self-Realization, etc., in which Nietzsche and Neo-Hegelianism and other things are admirably discussed with the result [the keynote of the book, the dynamic, the liberated, the progressive self] that the essential factor in morality is the "constant formation and reformation of the self in the ends in which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole." "Our ideals, our types of excellence, are the various ways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and ever-expanding values of our concrete acts."

The third part, with its economic and political applications of ethical theory, had better now, — so far as the purposes of adequate description are concerned, — be left in the main to the reader. It is somewhat detailed in its treatment, taking up such specialized and controversial topics as the 'open' *versus* the 'closed' shop, the capi-

talization of corporations, unearned increment, and the minutiae of social legislation for wage earners. It will likely, therefore, be of service to students of the social questions of to-day, and it shows only too clearly how pressing these are upon the attention and the leisure of academic teachers in America. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether the impression it tends to create, that it is the business either of ethical science or of morality to furnish independent and formulated solutions of burning questions, is not calculated, after all, to rob morality of much of its interest, and the moral man of something of his very responsibility. There is for him no predetermined or formulated solution of any concrete difficulty apart from the precedent he may himself create, or apart from the attitude of his own will and the attitude to which it may lead on the part of others.

The reader will find in this part, however, the same cogency of argumentation, the same stimulating 'teaching' at which the authors successfully aim, the same closeness of grip on the realities of life and conduct, the same strong sense for concrete moral situations, the same power of shrewd moral observation, and the same acute perception of the drift of modern tendencies that characterizes the central theoretical portions of the volume, but at the same time,—I venture to suggest,—the same lack of definite characterization of the essential point of view, so far as right and wrong and the moral judgment are concerned, and the same Pragmatist tendency to regard that which 'works best' as the *desideratum* in the matter of a standard of conduct. It has too, I think, a somewhat disappointing and partial character, if we go to it (why should we not?) looking for not one or two but several more or less definite applications of moral theory. Economic and political questions, pressing although they may be, are not the chief or the only field for the application of ethical principles; and even if they were, the mere "setting free" of individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the "common good" does not seem to be anything very definite in the way of the application of ethical norms and ideas to contemporary economic and social efforts, especially when we remember the comparative absence from the theoretical portions of the work of a definite criterion of "consequences" and "good" apart from the very "voluntary" and "formative" tendencies of the individual to which reference is again made here.

The "more deliberate analysis and *experiment*" [?], what is claimed to be the "need of the hour" [it is surely something deeper than this] "against the *a priori* claims of both individualism and social-

ism" is not exactly the position we expect to see adopted in the case of philosophers at work upon the discovery of the light thrown by the moral ideal upon our present economic distress. Analysis and experiment may be good practical politics, or good sociology, or they may indeed be the one need of the student of social questions, but they are hardly important results for ethical theory, or even for "Applied Ethics," for both of which all mere "setting free" and all mere "experimentation" and all "good living" even (but we do not seem to find much about this in the book), are subservient to an ethical ideal — to a "moral criterion of political activity." And it is this last thing that Professor Dewey himself admits to be the object of the Practical Part. I mean that many things might liberate and "set free" character and capacity, but they might not be ethical at all; and the fault alike of our Western (or American) civilization and the general Pragmatist outlook on life and morals is their eternal belief in "experimentation" and "setting free," instead of in the *legitimacy* or the *illegitimacy* of certain kinds of "experiments" that are unfortunately continually made with human life and with conduct and with morality. And it is conceivable, even from the point of view of mere theory, that Professors Dewey and Tufts would have done more alike for ethics and for American students, if they had stood somewhat more above the economic struggle of to-day than they have done, and surveyed it all from a really higher standpoint — along with other things like moral disease, and character-building, and education, and moral training, crime, punishment, etc., that naturally come up for discussion or consideration in the Practical or the 'Applied' part of a book upon ethics.

After what has been said or implied it is perhaps unnecessary to quote from the book to indicate its explicit or implicit acceptance of the Pragmatist conception of first principles and of morality itself: "The classical conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable *importance in illuminating the obscure places of the moral life* and in giving the student *clues* [italics mine] which will enable him to explore it for himself." . . . "The aim has not been to instill the notions of a school or a ready-made system, but to show the development of theories out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies." But how does this general attitude 'work' in the matter of opening up an unequivocal answer to the question of the moral standard or the moral criterion — the article of a falling or a standing moral philosophy? Professor Dewey himself recognizes that "the perplexities and uncertainties of

direct [?] and personal behavior *invite a more abstract and systematic* [italics mine] impersonal treatment than that which they receive in the exigencies of their occurrence"; but where in the theoretical part of this work is this systematization or unification of conflicting stand-points effected? And is its suggestive and ingenious and interesting treatment of the "fruitfulness" and the "surveying power" of theories an adequate equivalent for that exposition of a relatively coherent body of truth which the student naturally looks for in a text-book setting forth the elements and the main conceptions and principles of a science? It may—strangely enough no doubt—such has been the treatment of ethical science for some thirty or forty years—be almost an unfair thing to accuse philosophers of reputation of an apparent inability to furnish in a treatment of the facts of conduct and the moral judgment, either a sharp or demonstratively operative criterion of the distinction between right and wrong or an explanation of the fact (or the illusion) that man seems to set up for himself and others a norm or rule of conduct in which he believes, in as persistent a manner as do æsthetically minded people in their judgment of the beautiful and the ugly. Yet this is only too true of the book before us, a thing that makes it, so far as the objectivity of the moral judgment is concerned, no better and no worse than the many books upon conduct and its principles that have appeared since the time of Green and Spencer.

Look how elusive and how dialectical is the following treatment of the question of a criterion or standard or central point of view in morals—without the attempt at a basal treatment of all alleged fundamental concepts that we are inclined to look for in philosophy. It is (1) the "*moral situation*" that is first suggestively but externally [it arises, we are told, when "ends" conflict, but what is "end"?] described. On p. 263 the result is reached that (2) the "*appropriate subject-matter of moral judgment* [not just the same topic as the "moral situation"] is *disposition*" in view of the "consequences" it tends to produce. On p. 364 "moral situation" and moral judgment have become (3) "*moral worth*"; disposition as manifest in endeavors is the seat of moral worth. And on p. 393 it is (4) the tendency of the moral act to "*sustain a whole complex system of social values*" that has become the *problem of morality*, just as this again is explicitly said a few pages further on to be (5) the "*formation*" of a *voluntary* self out of "*original instinctive impulses*,"—the really recurring theme of the book, a "genetic," but not an ultimately explanatory point of view, so far as the moral judgment of right and wrong

is concerned. We are 'ever learning,' as it were, about morality, but never able to come to a "knowledge of the truth" of our tendency to dogmatize about right and wrong in ourselves and others. . . . To "growth," and "liberation," and the balance between intention and result, and to "fruitfulness" of apprehension on the part of the student, everything as it were is sacrificed. Is it not all, we might say, just too "modernistic," too aggressively "vital," and "practical," and too merely illuminating from a pædagogical standpoint? And would it not be better for the youth to learn that not everything practical and formative and liberative is really moral, that his needs as a student are not everything from the standpoint of existing or discovered theory, and that morality stands for something on its own account?

Are there not important omissions too in the book? One might reasonably demand the systematic treatment just desiderated, in some one place, either of the fundamental conceptions of ethical theory, or of the unification of the various illuminating points of view actually adopted in this book. And with this there should go a clear differentiation of ethical science from the sociology, and the morality as a personal effort, that bulk so largely in it, and also from the point of view of the natural and the descriptive sciences and from that of philosophy itself. Then there is the whole (actual or supposed) Evolutionary or Development theory of morals; much of it to be sure is not ethics at all, but this might have been indicated in a book which makes so much of personal and social development. And are not the psychological aspects of ethics made unduly subservient to the sociological? And lastly is it not — even upon any theory or any assemblage of fruitful points of view about conduct — somewhat unfortunate that a text-book upon ethics in an important series, by important philosophers, should leave the student without some sections upon ethical ideals as leading out of the realm of the so-called actual into philosophy as the supreme synthesis of facts and ideals.

If space permitted, attention might instructively be drawn to more than one illustration of the many conspicuous merits or results that are due to its clearly conceived and definitely instructive (or practical) point of view—its power, *e. g.*, to surprise and delight the reader with the most valuable kind of corollaries or suggestions regarding many of the tendencies in our present personal or social endeavors. The average reader will find it in fact a mine of acute reflection and information in this connection, and it will therefore have an influence outside the sphere of the mere university class-room. Still this relevancy to present fact and present tendencies is just the very thing we would

expect from the pragmatist attitude, and it does not relieve the book after all from the charge of its comparative failure to set up a definite picture of the attitude of the moral man, in our present transitional or would-be constructive age. Such a man, in common parlance, does not merely keep up with the procession, going in for its endless "formations" and "re-formations"; he seeks to lead it. And I do not think the book accounts for this. It would, in other words, have been even more edifying and more constructive if it had been less practical and less sociological. It is typical, of course, of much that is strong and valuable in the way in which American scholars and teachers are accustomed to present truth to their pupils, but there are, I think, aspects of ethical science that transcend altogether such immediate needs and purposes. One wonders, too, whether even the student should not have been given a greater respect for the great literature of the subject of moral philosophy than this manual — by its own procedure — encourages him to take.

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